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OVERVIEW — This issue brief provides an overview of Medicare prescrip-
tion drug plans (PDPs), with a focus on fundamentals such as enrollment,
premiums, formularies, cost sharing, prices, payment, cost management, and
appeals and grievance processes. It also highlights major changes to the PDP
landscape between 2006 and 2007.
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The Nuts and Bolts of PDPs
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
(MMA) of 2003 established a voluntary outpatient prescription drug
benefit for Medicare beneficiaries starting January 1, 2006. Medicare sub-
sidizes the cost of the benefit, generally paying about 75 percent of its
costs. Between 2006 and 2015, the federal cost is estimated to be $746
billion.1 The drug benefit is administered through private entities called
prescription drug plans (PDPs) for beneficiaries in fee-for-service (tra-
ditional) Medicare or through Medicare Advantage prescription drug
(MA-PD) plans for beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare managed care.
Employers and unions offering retiree coverage that is at least as gener-
ous as Medicare’s drug benefit and meeting other requirements may
also qualify for Medicare subsidies to defray the cost of providing a
drug benefit to their retirees.
Most Medicare beneficiaries participate in traditional Medicare and re-
ceive their drug coverage through PDPs if they choose to enroll. What
makes PDPs unique in the Medicare market is that they offer “stand-alone”
prescription drug insurance that complements other Medicare benefits.
PDPs are licensed in the state(s) in which they offer plans2 and assume
partial financial risk for the drug costs of members. The assumption of
financial risk by a plan only offering a drug benefit, not a comprehensive
health insurance package, is a new concept in Medicare and is not com-
mon in the health insurance market. The majority of PDPs are sponsored
by large health insurance companies that have experience providing drug
benefits in the context of other health benefits, but not as a stand-alone
benefit for an aged population. Many PDP sponsors are Medicare man-
aged care organizations or insurers that provide Medicare supplemental
insurance (known as Medigap). For them, Medicare PDPs are an addi-
tional product line.
Part D was designed with the assumption that competition for benefi-
ciary enrollment among private plans, rather than direct government
action, would shape the Medicare prescription drug market and con-
tain overall costs. PDPs compete for beneficiary enrollment through the
premiums they charge, the number and type of drugs included on the
formulary, the cost-sharing amounts they require, the reputation of the
company sponsoring the PDP, the pharmacies in their networks, cus-
tomer service, and other factors. The desire to attract enrollees with vary-
ing needs and preferences has contributed to the great number of PDPs
and the diversity of their benefit offerings.
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PLAN PARTICIPATION IN PART D:
STANDING ROOM ONLY?
When Part D was enacted in December of 2003, there was some concern on
the part of policymakers that too few private plans would participate, leav-
ing beneficiaries little, if any, choice of plans and precluding competition
among plans. Indeed, the MMA included provisions for “fallback” plans
that would quickly ramp up to offer the drug benefit if no plans (or only
one plan) were offered in a particular geographic area. However, as it turned
out, over 1,400 PDPs were available across the nation in 2006, and over
1,900 will be available for 2007.3 This increase is attributable to several fac-
tors, including (i) new entrants into the PDP market,
(ii) more companies offering PDP products nationwide
(17 companies will offer products nationwide in 2007,
up from 10 in 2006), and (iii) some companies offering
more product choices than they did in 2006.
The large increase in the number of PDPs available to beneficiaries be-
tween 2006 and 2007 likely is a signal that companies believe PDPs are
profitable, require little investment, or are a low-risk venture.
Not all plans are available to each Medicare beneficiary. In implementing
the drug benefit, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
divided the country into 34 PDP regions.4 In each of these regions, benefi-
ciaries may choose among the PDPs available. Most regions had roughly
40 to 45 PDPs in 2006, with a high of 52 (in Pennsylvania and West Vir-
ginia) to a low of 27 (in Alaska). For 2007, the number of PDPs generally
available in each region increased to the range of 50 to 55, with a high of
66 (in Pennsylvania and West Virginia) and a low of 45 (in Alaska).
While beneficiaries generally have dozens of PDP choices, most are of-
fered by a much smaller number of companies. For example, in New York
state for 2007, 61 plans are being sponsored by 26 companies. In Califor-
nia, 55 plans are being offered by 23 companies. Many companies offer
multiple plans in each region in an effort to appeal to beneficiaries with
different needs and preferences. Over time, there may be some contrac-
tion in the number of plans as it becomes clearer which plans are most
appealing to beneficiaries.
BENEFIT DESIGN OPTIONS
The MMA permits a fair amount of variability in the drug benefit designs
PDP sponsors may offer. The benefit designs generally fit into one of three
categories: standard, actuarially equivalent,5 and enhanced. In 2006, the
majority of beneficiaries expressed a strong preference for actuarially
equivalent plans by enrolling in them in great numbers.
The Part D standard benefit for 2006 is defined in statute to include a
$250 deductible; 25 percent coinsurance6 for covered drug spending be-
tween $250 and $2,250; and 100 percent coinsurance for drug spending
The MMA permits a fair amount of
variability in the drug benefit designs
PDP sponsors may offer.
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between $2,250 and $5,100. This full responsibility for payment by the
beneficiary in the $2,250 to $5,100 range is popularly known as the “do-
nut hole” but referred to as the “coverage gap” for purposes of this issue
brief. After $3,600 in beneficiary true out-of-pocket (known as “TrOOP”)7
spending is reached, catastrophic coverage begins and beneficiaries are
responsible for cost sharing (the higher of 5 percent of the negotiated price,
or $2 for generic and preferred brand or $5 for nonpreferred drugs).8 While
the Medicare drug benefit is often described in the media in terms of this
standard benefit package, only 132 PDPs—about 9 percent of all PDPs—
actually offer this benefit design.9 According to the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 22 percent of enrollees are in plans
with a standard benefit design.10
The majority of beneficiaries—61 percent according to MedPAC—are en-
rolled in PDPs with actuarially equivalent coverage. Actuarially equiva-
lent coverage may include cost-sharing requirements that are different from
the standard benefit as long as (i) the cost sharing is actuari-
ally equivalent to the cost sharing included in the standard
benefit design, and (ii) catastrophic coverage begins when
$3,600 in TrOOP spending is reached. Actuarially equivalent
plans may include, for example, lower cost sharing on pre-
ferred drugs or on drugs purchased at preferred pharmacies. All PDP spon-
sors must offer at least one drug plan that is either a standard or actuarially
equivalent benefit. Just under half of the PDPs offered designs in 2006 that
were actuarially equivalent to the standard benefit design.
PDPs may also offer a package with extra benefits called enhanced cov-
erage. According to MedPAC, about 43 percent of PDPs offered plans
with this benefit design in 2006,11 but only 17 percent of beneficiaries are
enrolled in them.12 Enhanced coverage may include a $0 deductible, cov-
erage of more drugs, lower cost sharing, or coverage in the coverage gap.
However, these enhanced benefits come with generally higher premiums,
which may have contributed to lower enrollment in these plans. For some
beneficiaries, enrolling in a higher-premium plan that offers enhanced
benefits is the most cost-effective option, depending on the number and
type of prescription drugs the beneficiary takes.
When Medicare beneficiaries choose a PDP, they likely do not know
whether the PDP they are enrolling in is a standard, actuarially equiva-
lent, or enhanced plan. However, they have clearly voted with their feet
for plans other than standard plans. Time will tell whether enhanced
coverage plans become more popular with beneficiaries because of their
additional benefits despite generally higher premiums. In any event,
beneficiaries appear generally satisfied with the drug coverage they have
chosen. According to a recent survey, 81 percent of enrolled beneficia-
ries are satisfied with their Part D plan, and 74 percent of enrolled ben-
eficiaries report that they would select the same plan again.13
Beneficiaries appear generally sat-
isfied with the drug coverage they
have chosen.
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ENROLLMENT
The first opportunity for most current Medicare beneficiaries to sign up
for prescription drug insurance through Medicare began November 15,
2005, and ended on May 15, 2006. The next opportunity to enroll (or switch
plans) is November 15 through December 31, 2006, for coverage effective
January 1, 2007.
As of June 11, 2006, about 16.5 million Medicare beneficiaries were en-
rolled in PDPs and 6 million beneficiaries were enrolled in MA-PD plans.
An additional 6.9 million beneficiaries were receiving prescription drug
coverage through a former employer who is receiving a Medicare retiree
drug subsidy to provide drug coverage.
Enrollment in PDPs is concentrated in plans sponsored by a relatively
small number of companies. Forty-five percent of Medicare beneficiaries
in 2006 were enrolled in a plan sponsored by either United Health Care–
PacifiCare (including plans that are co-
branded with AARP) or Humana, Inc.
Only five companies account for 65 per-
cent of PDP enrollment.14 So, while there
are a great many PDPs, enrollment is con-
centrated in plans offered by relatively few
companies. In contrast, a fair number of
PDPs had enrollment of less than 100 members in 2006. Given that only a
few companies were able to garner the lion’s share of enrollment in 2006,
the number of new companies and additional plan offerings for 2007 is
surprising to some observers.
In addition to the concentration of enrollment in a relatively small num-
ber of PDPs, another notable fact is that low-income beneficiaries
account for about half of the enrollment in PDPs. Of the roughly 16.5
million individuals enrolled in PDPs in 2006, 8.3 million were low-in-
come beneficiaries who have the beneficiary premium and cost sharing
partially (or fully) subsidized by Medicare. By contrast, 1 million of the
6 million beneficiaries enrolled in MA-PDs are receiving such additional
benefits. This is because beneficiaries who are dually eligible for both
Medicare and Medicaid (called “dual eligibles”) were automatically
enrolled (or “auto-enrolled”) by CMS in PDPs but not in MA-PDs, un-
less the beneficiary was already enrolled in a Medicare Advantage plan.
Auto-enrollment of these beneficiaries, all of whom had prescription
drug coverage through Medicaid until implementation of Part D, was
intended to ensure continuity of drug coverage. About 6.1 million dual
eligibles were auto-enrolled in PDPs in 2006. Low-income beneficiaries
who are not dual eligibles had their enrollment “facilitated” by CMS;
that is, as of May 15, 2006, beneficiaries were enrolled in PDPs with
lower-than-average premiums if they qualified for low-income assis-
tance but had not yet chosen a plan on their own.15
Of the roughly 16.5 million individuals enrolled
in PDPs in 2006, 8.3 million were low-income
beneficiaries who received partial (or full) sub-
sidies from Medicare.
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs, MA-PDs,
or employer-sponsored plans receiving retiree drug subsidies under Part
D. All of this drug coverage is subsidized directly by Medicare. There are
also additional beneficiaries—almost 9 million of them according to CMS—
who have drug coverage from other sources including: TRICARE (1.9
million), Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan or FEHBP (1.6 million),
Veterans Administration (2 million), active workers with drug coverage
through their employer (2.6 million), and other sources (about 900,000).16
THE ABCs OF PDPs
Almost every PDP is unique, offering different premiums, formularies,
co-payment amounts, cost management approaches, and a host of other
features. Plans offered by the same company often have different premi-
ums in different geographic areas of the country. It could be said that “if
you’ve seen one PDP, you’ve seen one PDP.” Many believe that the varia-
tion observed is the basis for competition among PDPs and, therefore,
critical to maximizing both choice and cost containment. Others believe
that the variation makes it difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to compare
plans and make informed choices about enrollment.
To attract enrollment and manage costs, PDP sponsors craft a benefit pack-
age that includes a formulary, deductible and co-payment amounts, utili-
zation management tools, and other features. They also arrange a network
of pharmacies to dispense prescriptions and interface with beneficiaries.
Drug discounts and rebates are negotiated with drug manufacturers, and
FIGURE 1
Beneficiaries with Drug Coverage Through Medicare
(as of June 11, 2006)
0.92 million
Receive
low-income 
assistance
5.08 million
PDP Plans
[16.5 million]
8.3 million
Receive
low-income
assistance
MA-PD Plans
[6.0 million]
Medicare
Retiree Drug
Subsidy
[6.9 million]
8.2 million
PDP Plans
MA-PD Plans
Source: “Over 38 Million People With Medicare Now
Receiving Prescription Drug Coverage,” news re-
lease, U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, June 14, 2006; available at www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2006pres/20060614.html.
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dispensing fees are negotiated with pharmacies. Sponsors submit bids
to Medicare to provide proposed benefits, and monthly beneficiary pre-
miums are determined. The PDP sponsors hope that the benefit pack-
age (and cost management features) they have assembled, coupled with
the monthly premium, will represent an attractive offering to beneficia-
ries. Sponsors may change benefit package features each calendar year.
In comparing PDP features between 2006 and 2007, there are a few note-
worthy observations. First, as discussed above, there will be significantly
more PDPs available both nationwide and in each region in 2007. The
number of plans offering coverage in the coverage gap will increase, al-
though nearly all of this coverage is for generic, not brand name, drugs.
Consistent with 2006, a relatively small number of PDPs will have premi-
ums above $60 in 2007. The appendices include comparative information
for both 2006 and 2007 for all 34 regions.
Beneficiary Premiums and PDP Payments
Beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs typically pay a monthly premium for
Medicare drug coverage. Beneficiary premiums are calculated based on
the relationship between the plan’s bid and the average bid of all plans.
This provides incentives for PDP sponsors to bid competitively so that
beneficiary premiums are as low as possible, thus attracting enrollment.
Plans that bid lower have lower beneficiary premiums, and plans that
bid higher have higher premi-
ums. Because beneficiaries se-
lected plans with below-average
premiums in 2006, PDP spon-
sors had very clear incentives to
bid low for 2007 (Figure 2).
The national average bid is cal-
culated using enrollment-
weighted premiums; therefore,
the premiums of plans with very
large enrollment count more in
the national average bid calcula-
tion than the premiums for plans
with lower enrollment. Because
such a large share of beneficiaries
is enrolled in plans with lower-
than-average premiums in 2006,
the effect of using enrollment
weighting would have been to increase 2007 beneficiary premiums for many
plans. To avoid this effect, CMS used its demonstration authority17 to phase
in this weighting over several years. The phase-in will moderate premium
increases due to enrollment weighting.18 There is a federal cost associated
with the premium demonstration, but its magnitude is not yet known.
N AT I O N A L  A V E R A G E   B I D   A M O U N T
ABOVE
NATIONAL
AVERAGE
BELOW
NATIONAL
AVERAGE
If plan bid is...
Then premium is the...
Base Premium PLUS the Difference Between
the Plan Bid and the National Average Bid
Base Premium MINUS the Difference Between
the Plan Bid and the National Average Bid
FIGURE 2
Monthly Beneficiary
Premiums for a PDP
The monthly premium amount for a PDP is determined by
comparing the PDP’s bid to the national average bid. Lower
premiums tend to attract enrollment, thus creating com-
petitive pressure.
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Premiums for identical plans offered by the same sponsor can vary de-
pending on the geographic area in which the beneficiary resides. Na-
tionally, monthly PDP premiums range from a low of $9.50 to a high of
$135.70 for 2007.19 In 2006, monthly PDP premiums ranged from a low
of $1.87 to a high of $104.89. Some plans with higher premiums are of-
fering enhanced coverage designs. Enrollment in PDPs in 2006 tends to
be concentrated in plans with lower premiums. According to CMS, 38
percent of PDPs had premiums below what is known as the base benefi-
ciary premium of $32.20 in 2006. A large majority of beneficiaries in
2006 are enrolled in such plans,20 in large part due to the auto-enrollment
of low-income beneficiaries into low-cost plans.
The weighted-average PDP premium that beneficiaries paid in 2006 was
$24.21 The PDP average premium will be higher in 2007 than in 2006.22
Also, the distribution of premiums for PDPs with basic benefits is tighter
for 2007. That is, some higher-premium PDPs lowered their premiums
for 2007. On the other hand, enhanced coverage plans, on average, have
higher premiums in 2007 than in 2006.23
In addition to premiums paid by beneficiaries, PDPs receive payments from
Medicare to subsidize the cost of providing the benefit, including direct
premium payments toward monthly beneficiary premiums (estimated $20.2
billion in 2006), reinsurance and risk corridor payments toward catastrophic
and unexpectedly large drug expenses (estimated $12.0 billion in 2006),
and low-income subsidy payments toward premium and cost-sharing as-
sistance for low-income beneficiaries (estimated $17.6 billion in 2006).24
These and other payments represent Medicare’s financial contribution to
drug coverage. Payments to individual plans are generally made monthly,
with a reconciliation process for correcting under- and overpayments.
Despite significant Medicare payments to PDPs, non–low-income Medicare
beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs may still pay a sizeable share of their drug
expenses. CMS actuaries estimate that—on average—Medicare Part D will
pay about half of the total drug costs for typical, non–low-income beneficia-
ries in 2006, not taking monthly beneficiary premiums into account. For an
individual beneficiary, however, Medicare may end up paying more or less
than half, depending on such factors as the drug plan chosen, drugs taken,
and annual drug spending.
Cost Sharing
In addition to paying monthly premiums, beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs
typically pay cost sharing that may include an annual deductible and co-
payments or coinsurance on each prescription, as well as covered drug
costs in the coverage gap.25 Most PDP sponsors—85 percent in 2006—
offer a $0 deductible plan option. As of May 3, 2006, 69 percent of PDP
enrollees (and 90 percent of MA-PD enrollees) were in plans with $0
deductibles.26 The amount beneficiaries pay in co-payments or coinsur-
ance varies among PDPs and by type of drug (for example, brand versus
generic or preferred versus nonpreferred).
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Some PDPs offer partial coverage in the coverage gap. Most of these plans
offer coverage of generic drugs only, although a few PDPs offer coverage
of brand name drugs in the coverage gap as well. PDPs that provide cov-
erage of brand name drugs in the coverage gap may experience selection
effects; that is, beneficiaries with relatively high brand name drug needs
may be more likely to enroll in them.
A Kaiser Family Foundation study found that most large, national PDPs
have three tiers of cost sharing, as well as a specialty tier for very high-
priced or specialty drugs.27 The study found that the median co-payment
for plans with a three-tier model in 2006 was $5 for first-tier drugs, $25 for
second-tier drugs and $53 for third-tier drugs. The coinsurance amount for
the specialty tier among large national plans was most commonly 25 per-
cent of the negotiated price for that drug, but many plans charged between
30 and 33 percent of the negotiated price for those drugs.
Formularies
Virtually all PDPs use formularies, or lists of covered drugs, that effectively
limit the number and type of drugs paid for by the plan. Formularies are
used to steer enrollees to less expensive products, thereby keeping costs—
and premiums—down. Some products may be less expensive than others
because of manufacturer rebates or price discounts negotiated on certain
products. Manufacturers of multiple-source drugs
(that is, drugs for which there is a brand name or
generic alternative available in the market) offer
price discounts and/or rebates to PDPs in exchange
for exclusivity or preferred status (which usually
means lower cost sharing) on the formulary.28 The
competition among manufacturers to have their
drug, not their competitors’ drugs, on the formulary and preferably on a
lower cost-sharing tier, is a critical cost management tool. In most cases,
manufacturers are willing to offer a lower price (or a higher discount) for a
drug if its competitors’ similar drugs are not included on the formulary.
PDPs need to balance the lower prices attainable through the use of a more
restrictive formulary with enrollees’ desire to have more medicines (or
popular ones) available to them.
In an effort to prevent PDPs from systematically discouraging beneficia-
ries with certain health conditions from enrolling, the MMA requires PDPs
to offer a relatively broad range of drugs on their formularies. PDP for-
mularies generally must include a minimum of two drugs in each clinical
class and must include drugs that treat certain medical conditions. PDPs
must cover all, or “substantially all” drugs in six “classes of clinical con-
cern” identified by CMS: immunosuppressants, antidepressants,
antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, antiretrovirals, and antineoplastics.29 In
general, drugs in classes commonly used by Medicare beneficiaries may
be included on higher formulary tiers (that is, they may have higher coin-
surance or co-payments) only when an equivalent drug is included on a
lower formulary tier. Together, these protections are intended to ensure
The competition among manufacturers
to have their drug on the formulary and
on a low cost-sharing tier, is a critical cost
management tool.
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that beneficiaries have access to a broad range of drugs, while also giving
PDPs room to negotiate price discounts with manufacturers. Although
coverage of the drugs detailed above is a requirement, PDPs have some
latitude regarding the tier the drugs are on.
Research on PDP formularies indicates that there is a fair amount of varia-
tion in the number and type of drugs covered by PDPs. The Kaiser Fam-
ily Foundation study noted above found that, among national PDPs, an
average of 81 percent of brand name and generic drugs commonly used
by beneficiaries were included on PDP formularies in 2006.30 The most
restrictive formulary included in the study covered 64 percent of these
drugs, whereas the least restrictive formulary included 97 percent of them.
The study also indicated that inclusion of commonly used drugs varies
depending on the class or category of the drug. For example, 90 percent
of antidepressants are on the formularies studied, but only 60 percent of
drugs known as proton pump inhibitors (used to treat certain gastrointes-
tinal problems) are included. This difference in the number of drugs cov-
ered in various classes is sometimes the result of the requirements to cover
drugs in certain classes, as described above. If there are alternative drugs
available within the same cost-sharing tier, a lower number of drugs may
or may not signal an access problem.
Negotiated Prices
PDP sponsors negotiate rebates and discounts with drug manufacturers
and dispensing fees with pharmacies. Together, these two negotiations con-
tribute to the PDP’s “negotiated price” for a drug.31 Any coinsurance paid
by the beneficiary is a percentage of the negotiated price. And, for benefi-
ciaries with no coverage (in other words, paying 100 percent coinsurance)
in the coverage gap, the amount paid in the coverage gap is the negotiated
price. Therefore, the effectiveness of PDPs in negotiating with manufactur-
ers and pharmacies directly affects how much beneficiaries pay for drugs.
It is also one of the factors that may affect the beneficiary premium the PDP
offers; better negotiated prices may mean lower premiums.
The negotiation between manufacturers and PDPs is among the most im-
portant determinants of the overall cost of the Medicare drug benefit as it
is currently designed. Indeed, the MMA includes a “noninterference provi-
sion,” which prohibits the Secretary of Health and Human Services from
interfering in the negotiations between PDPs and manufacturers. This pro-
vision has been controversial, and its repeal has been discussed by some.
Repeal of the noninterference provision could pave the way for the Secre-
tary to negotiate prices directly with manufacturers. But some believe that
PDPs can conduct such negotiations more effectively than federal agen-
cies, and that the current provision already results in the lowest prices. The
Congressional Budget Office has reported that there would be no savings
to Medicare if the noninterference provision was repealed.32 Others,
however, believe that negotiations conducted by the Secretary would result
in larger discounts on prescription drugs and lower prices to beneficiaries.
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The effect of the repeal would clearly depend on what statutory language
would be inserted in its place. Permitting or requiring the Secretary to
negotiate prices for all drugs, certain high-priced drugs, most-used drugs,
or required minimum discounts are among the many possibilities. Who
would negotiate pharmacy dispensing fees (the Secretary or PDP spon-
sors) would also be an issue. If all PDPs offered the same prices as nego-
tiated by the Secretary, competition among PDPs
would no longer be based on the drug prices
PDPs were able to negotiate. The basis for com-
petition among PDPs would be less clear.
It is difficult to assess how the prices offered by
PDPs compare to prices offered by private in-
surance or other sources of discounts. CMS studies of prices indicate
that the lowest-cost PDPs tend to secure prices that are comparable to
or better than third-party insurance plan prices for commonly used
drugs.33 However, the results of comparative studies such as these can
differ, depending on the drugs selected, the mix of generic and brand
name drugs chosen, the plans used in the analysis, and whether the
comparison is drug-specific or based on groups of drugs.
Drug Utilization Management Tools
PDP sponsors, like virtually all insurers, commonly use protocols to man-
age drug costs, such as limiting the quantity of a dispensed drug, con-
ducting prior authorization before a drug is dispensed, and/or requiring
the enrollee to use lower-cost alternative medicines before approving
payment for a higher-cost drug (step therapy). These tools can also be
helpful in limiting drug-to-drug interactions, over- or underdosing, or
side-effects. Knowing whether a particular drug is on a PDP’s formulary
is important, but knowing whether the drug is subject to utilization man-
agement tools is also key to determining access.
A commonly used utilization management tool is quantity limits (for ex-
ample, placing limits on the amount of medication per prescription or lim-
its on the number of prescriptions for a particular medication in a fixed
time period). Quantity limits are easy to implement and relatively easy for
beneficiaries to understand. According to a recent study, step therapy is
used less often than quantity limits and is most commonly used on drugs
such as proton pump inhibitors and certain drugs used to treat hyperten-
sion. Prior authorization (that is, requiring that the plan approve a particu-
lar drug before it is dispensed) is a tool used slightly less often than step
therapy. Because prior authorization requires review by the PDP, it is an
expensive utilization management tool likely reserved for more costly or
perhaps risky therapies. For example, in the Kaiser study, 86 percent of
tumor inhibitors examined were subject to prior authorization.
The types of utilization management tools and the extent to which they are
used varies widely among PDPs.34 Utilization management techniques are
The effect of the repeal of the noninter-
ference provision would clearly depend
on what statutory language would be
inserted in its place.
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more likely to be applied to brand name drugs than generic drugs, and
they vary depending on the type of drug. About half of national PDPs use
at least one technique on 5 out of 10 widely used brand name drugs.
Grievances, Coverage Determinations, and Appeals
The MMA includes provisions for grievances, coverage determinations
(including exceptions), and appeals procedures. PDPs must provide in-
formation about their exceptions and appeals procedures to beneficiaries
who enroll in the plan.
Grievances are complaints by an enrollee about the PDP that do not in-
volve a coverage issue. A grievance may include a complaint about facts in
marketing materials or complaints about a rude employee. A PDP’s deci-
sion on a grievance is final; there is no appeals process for a grievance.
Coverage determinations are intended to provide a straightforward way
for PDP enrollees to obtain medically necessary drugs that are not on the
PDP’s formulary or to obtain drugs at a more favorable cost-sharing level.
PDPs grant exceptions to formulary rules when the plan determines that
it is medically appropriate to do so. PDPs must make a determination on
an exceptions request as expeditiously as possible, but no later than 72
hours after the request has been made. For enrollees with serious health
conditions, an expedited decision must be made within 24 hours. If a
plan denies an exceptions request, the enrollee or his or her representa-
tive (in some cases, the prescribing physician) may appeal the plan’s
decision. If at any point in the process the enrollee receives a favorable
decision, the appeals process ends. A beneficiary may appeal a plan’s
decision to the following parties (in successive order): the PDP, an inde-
pendent review entity, a Medicare administrative law judge, the Medi-
care Appeals Council, and federal district court.
The number of appeals and grievances a PDP experiences may be an indi-
cation of a larger problem within a plan or across plans. A large number of
appeals or grievances, particularly if clustered around a particular issue,
may signal a problem with clarity of marketing material, for example, or it
may indicate that a PDP is not providing a clear rationale for not covering
a particular drug. Some have argued that the processes for grievances, cov-
erage determinations, and appeals are too difficult for Medicare beneficia-
ries to navigate, particularly for those with cognitive impairments.
The data released by CMS on the overall magnitude of appeals and griev-
ances to date indicate that a small number of grievances and appeals have
been filed relative to the number of claims filed.35 It remains to be seen whether
this small number is due to enrollee satisfaction with plans or a lack of knowl-
edge of the procedures and options available for disputing an issue.
Additional Benefits for Low-Income Beneficiaries
Medicare contributes to the cost of the prescription drug benefit for all en-
rolled beneficiaries, with higher contributions (subsidies) made on behalf
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of low-income beneficiaries. Medicare pays for additional benefits for low-
income Medicare beneficiaries with incomes below 150 percent of the fed-
eral poverty level ($14,700 for an individual in 2006) and meeting certain
asset requirements. As stated earlier, almost half of beneficiaries enrolled
in PDPs are low-income individuals. Figure 3 summarizes the additional
benefits low-income beneficiaries receive, by income and asset level.
Premium Subsidies Taper Off for
Dual Eligibles with Larger Incomes
For beneficiaries with incomes at or above 135%
FPL and with assets valued above $10,000
(for an individual, or $20,000 for a couple),
the amount of premium subsidy decreases.
Beneficiaries with incomes at or above 150%
FPL receive no drug plan premium subsidy.
* Individuals who are not living in an institution. Institutionalized dual
eligibles are exempt from all cost sharing.
† Asset tests vary by state for full-benefit dual eligibles.
‡ No premium is required if the individual selects a PDP with a pre-
mium less than or equal to the low-income benchmark.
§ Co-payment and deductible amounts are indexed in future years.
¶ The catastrophic limit is defined as the point at which an individual has
spent $3,600 out of pocket on covered drugs in 2006. Because the ben-
eficiaries described here pay low or no co-pays or coinsurance, the vast
majority will never reach the catastrophic limit.
Source: CMS-4068-F, Federal Register, January 28, 2005, pp.
4388–4389.
Sliding Scale: Partial Premium Subsidies
No SubsidyFull Subsidy
75% of
Premium Subsidy
50% of
Premium Subsidy
25% of
Premium Subsidy
Percent of Federal Poverty Level
135% 140% 145% 150%
 Assets
Over 13 million Medicare beneficiaries have annual incomes of less than
150 percent of the federal poverty level ($14,700 for an individual) and
meet certain asset requirements, making them eligible for financial help
with their Part D premiums, deductibles, and co-pays. The amount of assis-
tance available depends on the income and asset levels of the beneficiary.
FIGURE 3
The Low-Income Subsidy:
Extra Assistance in 2006
for Beneficiaries with
Limited Means
     BENEFICIARY GROUPS
  Full Benefit Dual Eligibles*   Non-Full Benefit Dual Eligibles
Income <100% FPL >100% FPL <135% FPL >135% to 150% FPL
Individual N/A† N/A† $6,000 >$6,000  but  <$10,000 <$10,000
Couple $9,000 >$9,000  but  <$20,000 <$20,000
Premium Subsidy (%) 100%‡ 100%‡ 100%‡ 100%‡ Partial (see “Sliding Scale”)
Deductible None None None $50 $50
Copay (generic/brand)§ $1/$3 $2/$5 $2/$5 15% coinsurance 15% coinsurance
 Above Catastrophic No cost No cost No cost $2/$5 co-pay $2/$5 co-pay
Limit?¶ sharing sharing sharing
[
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Most beneficiaries qualifying for low-income assistance receive a premium
subsidy that pays the monthly beneficiary premium for plans with below-
average premiums. Some low-income beneficiaries who are not dually eli-
gible for both Medicare and Medicaid or who have assets pay a portion of
the premium. For 2007, most low-income beneficiaries will be able to choose
among 15 to 22 PDPs with $0 premium. Low-income beneficiaries also pay
reduced cost sharing (including lower or no co-pays and deductibles).
The Medicare drug benefit is a comprehensive and relatively generous
benefit for most low-income beneficiaries, particularly those dually eli-
gible for both Medicare and Medicaid. For 2006, Medicare will have paid
for an average of about 96 percent of drug spending for low-income ben-
eficiaries, and 98 percent for dual eligibles.
CONCLUSION
A healthy dose of skepticism accompanied passage of the Medicare drug
benefit in 2003. Some questioned whether private plans would partici-
pate, others questioned whether implementation would be consistent with
statutory deadlines or smooth. Implementation initially was marred by
computer and other glitches that led to uncertainty around coverage for
many beneficiaries, particularly low-income beneficiaries. Anecdotal re-
ports of beneficiaries leaving pharmacies without needed drugs caused
serious concern, and, more recently, some beneficiaries have had trouble
with monthly premiums being deducted correctly from their Social Secu-
rity checks. There were a number of computer, financial, and other issues
involving states and the transition of low-income beneficiary drug cover-
age from Medicaid to Medicare. CMS worked to address these and a num-
ber of other issues throughout the first year of the program.
On the other hand, participation by private plans in Part D has far exceeded
expectations in 2006 and 2007. Concerns about insufficient plan participa-
tion are a faded memory. Beneficiary satisfaction seems reasonably high,
and beneficiary premiums and overall program expenditures will be lower
than expected for 2006 and 2007. As the second year of this benefit begins,
it is too soon to make an accurate assessment of the overall success of the
new program. Time, and continued analyses of its major features, will tell.
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